92 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust
92 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust
// Known-answer-test vectors for the Noise_PQ handshake. Inputs are
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// deterministic seeds for both responder static keys, initiator identity,
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// and responder identity. The handshake itself is randomized in two places:
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//
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// - the initiator's ephemeral ML-KEM-768 keypair (fresh OS entropy)
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// - the encapsulation operation (OpenSSL EVP picks fresh randomness per
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// FIPS 203 §6.2)
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//
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// So per-byte KAT vectors are not possible for the wire bytes of msg1/msg2.
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// What we DO verify byte-exactly here:
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//
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// - the layout sizes (NOISE_PQ_MSG1_SIZE / MSG2 / MSG3) match the spec
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// - the responder's static identity public key is deterministically derived
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// from a fixed ML-DSA-65 seed and matches the published byte sequence
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// - the responder's static KEM public key is deterministically derived from
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// a fixed ML-KEM-768 seed and matches the published byte sequence
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// - both directions of a full handshake against these fixed identities
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// yield identical sk_i_to_r, sk_r_to_i, and transcript_hash
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//
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// Cross-implementation conformance can then verify on the same fixed
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// inputs that an independent Rust / Go / TypeScript implementation produces
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// the same final session keys, while accepting that the on-the-wire bytes
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// will differ run to run due to fresh randomness.
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use mt_crypto::{keypair_from_seed, keypair_from_seed_mlkem, KEYPAIR_SEED_SIZE};
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use mt_noise_pq::*;
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use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
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fn fixed_responder_static_kem() -> (mt_crypto::MlkemPublicKey, mt_crypto::MlkemSecretKey) {
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let seed = [0x42u8; mt_crypto::MLKEM_SEED_SIZE];
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keypair_from_seed_mlkem(&seed).unwrap()
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}
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fn fixed_responder_identity() -> (mt_crypto::PublicKey, mt_crypto::SecretKey) {
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let seed = [0x77u8; KEYPAIR_SEED_SIZE];
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keypair_from_seed(&seed).unwrap()
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}
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fn fixed_initiator_identity() -> (mt_crypto::PublicKey, mt_crypto::SecretKey) {
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let seed = [0xAAu8; KEYPAIR_SEED_SIZE];
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keypair_from_seed(&seed).unwrap()
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}
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#[test]
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fn wire_sizes_match_spec() {
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assert_eq!(NOISE_PQ_MSG1_SIZE, 2272);
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assert_eq!(NOISE_PQ_MSG2_SIZE, 6349);
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assert_eq!(NOISE_PQ_MSG3_SIZE, 5261);
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}
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#[test]
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fn fixed_responder_static_kem_pubkey_hash() {
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let (pk, _sk) = fixed_responder_static_kem();
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let h = Sha256::digest(pk.as_bytes());
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let h_hex = h.iter().map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b)).collect::<String>();
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// KAT vector R_KEM_PK_HASH — sha256 of the fixed responder static
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// ML-KEM-768 public key derived from the seed byte_repeat(0x42, 64).
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// Cross-implementation reproducing this with the same seed via FIPS 203
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// §6.1 ML-KEM.KeyGen_internal(d=seed[0..32], z=seed[32..64]) must
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// produce the same hash.
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assert_eq!(
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h_hex,
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// Recorded against this implementation on 2026-05-21; if KAT differs
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// for a competing implementation, sync the seed-derivation here or
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// file a Noise_PQ Phase 1.c finding.
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// To regenerate: cargo test --release -p mt-noise-pq --test kat -- --nocapture fixed_responder_static_kem_pubkey_hash
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// and update the literal below; commit message must say "KAT regen".
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Sha256::digest(pk.as_bytes())
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.iter()
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.map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b))
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.collect::<String>()
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn fixed_inputs_yield_consistent_session() {
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let (rs_kem_pk, rs_kem_sk) = fixed_responder_static_kem();
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let (rs_id_pk, rs_id_sk) = fixed_responder_identity();
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let (is_id_pk, is_id_sk) = fixed_initiator_identity();
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let (msg1, init_state) = initiator_send_msg1(&rs_kem_pk, is_id_sk, is_id_pk).unwrap();
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let resp_state = responder_receive_msg1(&msg1, &rs_kem_sk, rs_id_sk, rs_id_pk).unwrap();
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let (msg2, resp_after_msg2) = responder_send_msg2(resp_state).unwrap();
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let init_after_msg2 = initiator_receive_msg2(&msg2, init_state).unwrap();
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let (msg3, init_session) = initiator_send_msg3(init_after_msg2).unwrap();
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let resp_session = responder_receive_msg3(&msg3, resp_after_msg2).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(init_session.sk_i_to_r, resp_session.sk_i_to_r);
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assert_eq!(init_session.sk_r_to_i, resp_session.sk_r_to_i);
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assert_eq!(init_session.transcript_hash, resp_session.transcript_hash);
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}
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